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A particular section of the statute should not be inconsistent with the rest of the statute. When the legislature enumerates an exception to a rule, one can infer that there are no other exceptions. American Tel. Missouri Municipal League, U. If the court views the issue as one of deference to an administrative interpretation, then the agency's choice of one dictionary definition over another may indicate sufficient "reasonableness.
Citibank South Dakota , U. See also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. March 22, holding that "filing" a complaint included complaints made orally.
Smith v. Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued for a narrower reading: "[To] use an instrumentality normally means to use it for its intended purpose. When someone asks 'Do you use a cane? Similarly, to speak of 'using a firearm' is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i. The Court had less difficulty with the provision in , overruling a lower court's holding that proximity and accessibility of a firearm are alone sufficient to establish "use.
The Bailey Court, however, defined "use" in such a way "active employment" as to leave the Smith holding intact. See also Muscarello v. Abuelhawa v. Postal Service, U. The majority in Smith , which construed "use of a firearm" broadly, stated there was a general understanding that drugs and firearms are a dangerous combination and saw no reason why Congress would want to distinguish use of a firearm as a weapon in a drug crime from use of a firearm in barter in a drug crime; according to the majority, both circumstances involved a grave possibility of violence and death.
The unanimous Court in Abuelhawa , which construed "facilitate" narrowly, stated that a broad reading which would have led to higher criminal penalties could be inconsistent with the gradation of similar and more serious offenses. Cabell v.
Markham, F. Justice Stevens expressed a preference for established interpretation over dictionary definitions. Winn, U. Long Beach Fire and Ambulance Serv.
O'Driscoll, F. A corollary is that use of the disjunctive "or" creates "mutually exclusive" conditions that can rule out mixing and matching. Williams, F. Moore, F. Ballentine, U. Both "and" and "or" are context-dependent, and each word "is itself semantically ambiguous, and can be used in two quite different senses. American Bus Ass'n v. Slater, F. See also Reid v. Angelone, F. Apotex Corp. Commissioner, U. But cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, U. Warden, Metro.
Correctional Center, F. Union Elec. Consolidation Coal Co. Bankers Ins. Florida Res. Underwriting Ass'n, F. Singer ed. Davis, U. Siegel v. Thoman, U. Zerbst, U. Illinois Cent R. See also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, U. The Dictionary Act provides that "unless the context indicates otherwise," "words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things; words importing the plural include the singular.
Amalgamated Bank, U. May 29, Fourco Glass Co. Transmirra Products Corp. The same principle is used to resolve conflict between two statutes. Estate of Romani, U. See also Morton v. Mancari, U. Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, U. Alloyd Co. Quicken Loans, U. May 24, terms in phrase prohibiting giving or accepting of any "portion, split, or percentage" of a real estate settlement charge unless a service was actually rendered reinforce one another and the conclusion that the prohibition does not cover a loan provider assessing an unearned fee for itself alone.
Jarecki v. The language at issue in Graham County barred qui tam actions under the False Claims Act that were based on certain publicly available government documents, and a broad interpretation of the language effectively limited the circumstances in which private parties could sue to recover funds fraudulently obtained from the government by others. Beecham v. The Court often explains that this and similar canons are only vehicles for ascertaining the correct meaning of otherwise uncertain terms.
Train Dispatchers, U. Turkette, U. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. Keffeler, U. The principle cannot be applied if the enumerated categories are too "disparate.
Ohio Power Co. And, of course, context may reveal that application is inappropriate. Circuit City Stores, Inc. Adams, U. The application of the rule of ejusdem generis in this case, however, is in full accord with other sound considerations bearing upon proper interpretation of the clause. Alabama Dept. During a five-year period, the Court addressed the scope of the term "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act in four separate cases. In the ACCA, "violent felony" includes, inter alia , a crime that "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another " emphasis added.
In James v. United States , a five-Justice majority found that attempted burglary fit within the residual clause because it entails a significant risk of bodily injury, which, according to the majority, is the most relevant common attribute of the listed crimes, and not that they are all completed crimes, as the petitioner had argued.
In Begay v. United States , the majority found DUI to fall outside the residual clause because it is too dissimilar to the listed crimes, being a crime that need not be deliberate, among other things. With somewhat less emphasis on ejusdem generis reasoning, a unanimous Court found failure to report to prison beyond the residual clause in Chambers v.
United States , finding the crime to be passive and not aggressive conduct as the listed crimes are. Two years later, a majority of the Court in Sykes v. United States found the crime of vehicle flight to carry a level of risk, and a mens rea requirement, comparable to the listed crimes and, therefore, within the residual clause. June 9, Dissenting in Sykes , Justice Scalia reviewed the several tests the Court had derived from its various characterizations of the listed crimes in the ACCA cases and declared the residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague.
Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co. Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Patrickson, U. Barnhart v. Thomas, U. An example of the "rule of the last antecedent" not being strictly followed is Nobelman v. American Savings Bank , U.
Under a section of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy plan can modify the "rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by [the debtor's residence]. In this instance, the rule of the last antecedent would link the modifying clause to "claims" and imply that a home mortgage does not cover an amount greater than a home's fair market value.
For policy and practical reasons, however, the Court read the modifying clause as saying "other than the rights of holders of a claim secured only by the debtor's residence.
United States Trustee, U. So too, in another case the Court shied away from "the most natural grammatical reading" of a statute to avoid an interpretation that would have raised a serious issue of constitutionality.
X-Citement Video, Inc. Justice Scalia, dissenting, insisted that the language was perfectly clear, and that the rejected interpretation was "the only grammatical reading. Hibbs v. See also Bailey v. In a case analyzing the significance of the adjective "applicable" in a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the majority opinion relied on the presumption again superfluity to hold that "applicable" had a limiting effect, whereas Justice Scalia, in dissent, observed that "[t]he canon against superfluity is not a canon against verbosity.
When a thought could have been expressed more concisely, one does not always have to cast about for some additional meaning to the word or phrase that could have been dispensed with. Wilson, U. INS, U. There is an exception for minor, unexplained changes in phraseology made during recodification—changes that courts generally assume are "not intended to alter the statute's scope.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, U. Defendant in Pennsylvania sent altered documentation about certain automobiles to Virginia and obtained valid Virginia auto titles incorporating false facts contained in the altered documents.
The new titles were then sent back to defendant in Pennsylvania. The federal forgery statute prohibited receipt of "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities. Dissenting Justice Scalia objected to the Court's straining to avoid holding that "falsely made" is redundant: "The principle [against mere surplusage] is sound, but its limitation 'if possible' should be observed.
It should not be used to distort ordinary meaning. Nor should it be applied to obvious instances of iteration to which lawyers, alas, are particularly addicted.
Coca-Cola Co. June 12, See also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Ratzlaf v. See also Gustafson v. William Wrigley, Jr. Brown v. Gardner, U. Bossier Parish Sch. Robers v. May 5, Sullivan v. See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Cline, U. For disagreement about the appropriateness of applying this limitation, contrast the Court's opinion in Gustafson v. Keene Corp. United States. Reynolds, U. Lindh v. Murphy, U. King v. Vincent's Hospital, U. Chapman v. See Field v.
Mans, U. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, U. See also Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, U. KFC Western, Inc. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. Also Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. January 14, when Class Action Fairness Act authorizes removal of a state case to federal court as a "mass action" if the case was brought by or more persons, only named plaintiffs may be counted; in the same statute, Congress explicitly had included counting "unnamed parties in interest" toward meeting class action thresholds and could have done so under the mass action provision if it so chose.
Birmingham Bd. Winterboer, U. Justice Scalia in his opinion for the Court in Asgrow called 7 U. In another case, the Court found statutory language "incoherent" due to use of three different and conflicting standards identifying an evidentiary burden.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, U. The Court resolved the issue by treating the "incoherence" as ambiguity, and by applying the one possible construction that did not raise constitutional issues. FMC Corp. Holliday, U. Burns v. Schweiker, F. Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co. Bestfoods, U.
Moreno, U. Holley, U. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. FDA v. Ordinarily the Court does not require reference to specific applications of general authority, but in this instance "hardly an ordinary case" the Court majority attached importance to the FDA's longstanding disavowal of regulatory authority over tobacco, and to subsequently enacted tobacco-specific legislation that stopped short of conferring authority to ban sale of the product.
Iselin v. See also Lamie v. Obviously, the line between the permissible filling in of statutory gaps and the impermissible adding of statutory content may be indistinct in some instances, and statutory context, congressional purpose, and overriding presumptions may tip the scales.
For example, the Court made no mention of the "absent word" rule in holding that a reference to "any entity" actually meant "any private entity" in the context of preemption.
Nixon v. Andrus v. Glover Const. Demarest v. Manspeaker, U. Congress quickly acted to override this result and prohibit payment of witness fees to prisoners, P. NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists, U. For an extensive listing of substantive canons, by type, used in Supreme Court decisions from , along with accompanying case citations, see William N.
S olimino U. In this instance, Justice Souter characterized the maxim that judge-made law implicitly continues to apply as an analytical starting point only, one that would give way as statutory context or purpose indicates. The opinion eschewed any formulaic application that would make the maxim dispositive absent a "clear statement" in the statute to the contrary.
Judge Wald described one such presumption as requiring that Congress "signal[ ] its intention in neon lights. See generally pp. See also William N. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, U.
Pennsylvania Pub. Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, U. Townsend, U. Sorrell, U. Dixon, U. June 23, Ginsburg, J. June 23, Roberts, C. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. Mortier, U.
See also Medtronic Inc. Lohr, U. Nevertheless, any presumption disfavoring preemption of state law may go only so far. Mensing , for example, four Justices characterized the Supremacy Clause phrase asserting federal pre-eminence "any [state law] to the Contrary notwithstanding" as a non obstante provision that "suggests that federal law should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state law" and indicates limits on the extent to which courts should seek to reconcile federal and state law in preemption cases.
In contrast to the congressional intent required to support preemption of a state-based cause of action, Congress displaces a potential cause of action under federal common law i. American Electric Power Co.
Connecticut, U. June 20, federal common law suit to abate greenhouse gas emissions as a public nuisance held to have been displaced by the Clean Air Act. Bond v. June 2, no clear statement from Congress that statute implementing Chemical Weapons Convention was meant to support federal prosecution of a purely local assault crime committed with harmful, but not illegal, chemical compounds.
Moran, U. Liggett Group, Inc. Compare Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. A statement asserting preemption or disclaiming intent to preempt must be clear not only as to preemptive intent, but also as to scope.
In International Paper Co. Ouellette , U. See also Nixon v. The Eleventh Amendment states that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against a state by citizens of another state or foreign country. By the late nineteenth century, the amendment was understood to mean that a state generally could not be sued without its consent.
The primary exception is that Congress may subject a state to suit through an exercise of its legislative authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 empowers Congress to pass laws effectuating civil rights promoted by the Amendment. Hoffman v. Connecticut Income Maint. Dep't, U. Scanlon, U. Nevada Dept. Hibbs U. Compare Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, U.
March 20, disallowing a damages suit against a state for violating the personal sick leave provisions of the FMLA; personal sick leave provisions held to be beyond Section 5 authority, because the personal sick leave provisions are not sufficiently tied to curbing discrimination. Jerome v. Arguably, the Jerome Court actually overstated the case, citing United States v.
Pelzer, U. Dickerson v. United States, S. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. The inquiry demands argument, and meaning requires construction. Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 98 "When we speak of clarity in construing the concepts expressed by statutes, we are not really making statements about the clarity of the concepts themselves. Rather, we are expressing judgments about the goodness of fit between the statutory concept and the thing or event in the world that is the subject of dispute.
Chapman v. Higbee Co. Solan, supra note , at 13, 26 arguing most plain meaning is determined by "what linguists call a generative grammar, the set of internalized rules and principles that permit us, unselfconsciously, to speak and understand language with ease and with great rapidity," and claiming that in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, "the question is whether the meaning of the disputed language is determined fully by our generative grammars, or whether disputed aspects of the meaning are left open as part of the residue of meaning that our internal grammars do not fully determine".
Compare, e. Because the fibers absorb the alcohol, the LSD solidifies inside the paper rather than on it. You cannot pick a grain of LSD off the surface of the paper. Ordinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture. Would the gelatin be a part of the mixture or substance in an LSD case if a defendant sprayed an LSD-alcohol solution into a capsule, but not if a grain of LSD were placed into the capsule with a tweezers?
It is not enough to say that 'ordinary usage' precludes including the weight of a heavy glass bottle. The words 'mixture or substance' are ambiguous. Easterbrook, Statutes ' Domains , 50 U. See Ward Farnsworth et al. But it would cut [18 U. Hall, U. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. In their book cataloguing the canons of construction, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner describe this concept as part of the "whole text canon.
See United Sav. Ass ' n of Tex. Gardner, U. City of Chicago v. Fund, U. But cf. Caraco Pharm. Turkette, U. Canons are expressly intended to limit judicial discretion by rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared principles.
When the conditions presupposed by a canon do not obtain, then it should not be used. A canon. For more discussion of the theoretical arguments for and against using the canons, see infra " Justifications: Disrepute and Rehabilitation.
See infra " Justifications: Disrepute and Rehabilitation. The list in the latter casebook builds upon the list given in William N.
Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation: Cases and Materials 2d ed. The use of semantic canons can therefore be understood simply as a form of textual analysis. Law Sch. This is based on our view that the plain meaning rule is the constitutionally compelled starting place for any statutory construction and that tools of interpretation are only applicable when, for whatever reason, the plain meaning rule fails to provide the answer.
Judges also disagree about whether the plain meaning rule is a special and superior canon. Peters, N. Comm'r, F. Barnhart v. Thomas, U. See also Lockhart v. That is particularly true where it takes more than a little mental energy to process the individual entries in the list, making it a heavy lift to carry the modifier across them all.
Suppose your friend told you not that she wants to meet 'an actor, director, or producer involved with Star Wars,' [in which case the modifier would apply to the entire list] but instead that she hopes someday to meet 'a President, Supreme Court Justice, or actor involved with Star Wars.
This canon is also sometimes referred to as the "canon against superfluity. P'ship, U. Franklin, U. Bailey v. See Microsoft Corp. See Kavanaugh, supra note , at "[H]umans speak redundantly all the time, and it turns out that Congress may do so as well. Congress might do so inadvertently.
Or Congress might do so intentionally in order to, in Shakespeare's words, make 'double sure. Solimino, U. See Solan, supra note , at 65 stating substantive canons "stack the deck in favor of one party and against another" ; People v.
Hall, N. Ameritech Servs. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, U. This cardinal principle. Crowell v. Benson, U. This canon is distinct from other variations on the principle of constitutional avoidance, including the "rule of judicial procedure" stating that "'if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction.
Valley Auth. Resendiz-Ponce, U. The procedural rule tells a court when to decide a statutory question i. This report uses the term to refer to the canon, although there is room for disagreement regarding how to classify various aspects of the constitutional avoidance doctrine. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Sebelius, U.
A court might cite the constitutional-avoidance canon as support for its conclusion that a particular reading of a statute is the best interpretation, but in that instance, the canon likely is not bearing any analytical weight. Such a standard would deprive the doctrine of all function. Rather, the doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is 'susceptible of' the problem-avoiding interpretation—when that interpretation is reasonable , though not necessarily the best.
Attorney General v. See also Eric S. Crowell , U. Brown v. Plata, U. Velazquez, U. Some judges have argued that the constitutional-avoidance canon should be used sparingly, if at all. In doing so they expand, very questionably in my view, the effective scope of the Constitution, creating a constitutional penumbra in which statutes wither, shrink, are deformed. A better case for flexible interpretation is presented when the alternative is to nullify Congress's action: when in other words there is not merely a constitutional question about, but a constitutional barrier to, the statute when interpreted literally.
X-Citement Video, Inc. In the instant case, the rule directly supports petitioner's contention that the Government must prove knowledge of illegality to convict him.
Monsanto, U. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom , supra note , at "[I]t has been many years since any legal scholar had a good word to say about any but one or two of the canons, but scholarly opinion.
Llewellyn, supra note 71 , at Frankfurter, supra note 8 , at "[C]anons of construction. See also SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp. An almost equally impressive collection can be made of decisions holding that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. What, then, shall we say of the construction of a [statute] like this which may be the basis of either civil proceedings of a preventive or remedial nature or of punitive proceedings, or perhaps both?
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom , supra note , at USI Film Prods. Solan, supra note , at 31 suggesting some canons embody two "types of devices," reflecting the way English speakers generally understand language: "[1] interpretive strategies that function to ease the rapid processing of language as it is heard or read, but which can be overridden if their application leads to nonsensical or ungrammatical interpretations of sentences, and [2] rules of grammar, which make certain interpretations impossible," and questioning whether judges apply the canons consistently with linguistic theory.
See also Nelson, supra note 98 , at , arguing textualists prefer the canons to legislative history because of their more rule-like nature ; William N. The Court's opinions in the last two Terms reflect this revival urged by the new textualists. Nelson, supra note 98 , at Nelson prefers these categories to the traditional distinction between semantic and substantive canons.
Cass R. Nelson, supra note 98 , at "It requires little argument to link canons of this sort to the likely intent of the enacting legislature. Their usefulness in identifying authors' intent is precisely why the principles underlying these canons are widely used in society at large.
See Nelson, supra note 98 , at "Many of the canons used by textualists reflect observations about Congress's own habits. Some of these insights, however, may be incorrect, as discussed in more detail infra , " Studies of Legislative Drafting. See Scalia, supra note 82 , at 29 "The rule of lenity is almost as old as the common law itself, so I suppose that is validated by sheer antiquity. Wiltberger, 18 U. That knowledge. Christopher J. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. But see Abbe R. Others argue that even if the constitutional-avoidance canon does not advance legislative supremacy, it may be useful to protect constitutional values, by allowing courts to impose narrowing constructions on constitutionally dubious statutes.
See Eskridge et al. Edward J. See also Breyer, supra note 32 , at arguing legislative history is more accessible than the canons to give notice of statutory meaning. Once it is understood that meaning depends on context, and that contexts vary, how could it be otherwise?
Scalia, supra note 82 , at 27 "Every canon is simply one indication of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications perhaps supported by other canons , it must yield.
Rehner, U. In the present case, congressional intent is clear from the face of the statute and its legislative history. Thompson, A. Foreman, A. Sinclair, supra note , at See also Varity Corp.
Howe, U. Chertoff, U. In this case, traditional tools of statutory construction and considerations of stare decisis compel [a certain] conclusion. There is no need for us to resort to the. Roemer, U. If not—and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that ordinary meaning. Two concurring opinions in that case argued that the Court should have also considered the statute's legislative history, id.
Dep't of Labor, F. Cohen, U. Eskridge et al. This report addresses only pre-enactment legislative history, and does not discuss the even more contentious category of post-enactment legislative history. The report addresses separately other post-enactment interpretive tools infra " Statutory Implementation. See Weber , U. Dep't of the Navy, U. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language. Concluding that the text is ambiguous with respect to [that question], we then seek guidance from legislative history.
Judge Brett Kavanaugh has argued that "the indeterminacy of the trigger"—that is, determining when the text is ambiguous— "greatly exacerbates the problems with the use of legislative history. Realty Tr. Somers, S. Underwood, U. Similarly, courts may—in rare cases—use legislative history to determine that Congress made a mistake.
Agents of Am. Statutes in this conception have purposes or objectives that are discernible. The task of the judge is to make sense of legislation in a way that is faithful to Congress's purposes. So, how Congress makes its purposes known, through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected, lest the integrity of legislation be undermined.
This justification for using legislative history appeals beyond purposivists to at least some pragmatists. See also Conroy v. Aniskoff, U. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. This concern rests on the "intent skepticism" shared by both textualists and purposivists. Kavanaugh, supra note , at Intervenor v. Mortier, U. Adams, U. Patricia M. Allapattah Servs. Levine, U. Zurich Am. Calvert Distillers Corp. See also Katzmann, supra note , at 54 arguing "conference committee reports and committee reports" should be considered most authoritative, "followed by statements of the bill's managers in the Congressional Record, with stray statements of legislators on the floor—who had heretofore not been involved in consideration of the bill—at the bottom" ; Victoria F.
See also George A. Zuber v. Allen, U. Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report in this instance. Brown, U. Stone v. INS, U. Blake, S. Guillen, U. League, U. See supra notes 87 to 92 and accompanying text discussing dynamic theories of interpretation.
Nicholas S. This finding was confirmed in more recent empirical studies of Supreme Court cases. See Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court ' s First Era , supra note , at suggesting there are two camps of Justices that use practical consequences in distinct ways ; Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons , supra note , at noting empirical evidence that the Supreme Court frequently uses practical consequences to interpret statutes.
Burlington N. White, U. Dep't of Educ. See Chevron U. Natural Res. Council, U. Roche Molecular Sys. Ct at majority opinion rejecting as insubstantial evidence of executive branch's "post-enactment practice" under statute ; Freeman v. For more in-depth discussions of how Justice Scalia employed practical consequences, see Jane S.
Schacter, Text or Consequences? United States , U. District of Columbia, S. Courts sometimes describe this as seeking to avoid absurd results. City of New York, U. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine , Harv. Whitman v. Trucking Ass'ns, U. Massachusetts, U. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.
See supra notes to and accompanying text. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons , supra note , at Manning, The New Purposivism , Sup. This text is patently clear. Certainly, it is safe to assume that most legislators do not know that canons even exist. At the same time, however, at most two others—Justice Scalia and perhaps Justice Thomas—have subscribed fully to the implications of the new textualism, professing opposition to the use of legislative history even to resolve ambiguity or confirm statutory meaning.
The balance of the Court seems to consist of textually constrained purposivists or, what may be the same thing, purpose-sensitive textualists. Mendelson, supra note , at 17, This study also tracked the Justices' use of legislative history, and this data "will be the basis for future analyses. The answer, somewhat to the embarrassment of the American legal system, is that courts find ordinary meaning anywhere they look and judges are not restrained in deciding where they are willing to look.
See also Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data , supra note , at But see Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress , supra note , at arguing the majority opinion's "question-begging" search of these databases was "fatally flawed".
Another example is Google's Ngram Viewer, which searches Google's store of scanned books for particular phrases, showing how frequently they have been used over time. Rasabout, P. See Lawrence M.
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